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A RESPONSE TO FEDDERS' "WAIVER BY CONDUCT"

Jean-Luc LEPINE *

Mr. Fedders' remarkable article "Waiver by Conduct" deserves the close
attention of securities regulators and governments primarily affected by the
internationalization of the securities markets. We, at the Commission des
Operations de Bourse (C.O.B.), share the view that national markets, whether
those of the United States or others, are becoming increasingly affected by
events initiated outside their borders.
In cases involving transnational securities transactions, secrecy laws and
blocking statutes of other countries have hampered investigations and attempts
to prosecute individuals involved in fraud. Yet, to attain our common objective
of maintaining the highest degree of market integrity, an increasingly efficient
form of cooperation among countries is required.
The idea developed in Mr. Fedders' article, leading him to call for the
international recognition of the principle of "waiver by conduct", is very
exciting. It deems the very act of effecting a transaction outside the jurisdiction
in which an operator is located, a willful waiver of the secrecy provisions that
the operator, his agent, or institution might claim. Thus, it brings a simple and
elegant solution to most of the problems encountered in international securities
markets. The solution, of course, assumes that the operator was properly
informed by his broker or banker of the alternatives: he submits to the full
jurisdiction of the stock market in which he is operating or refrains from
operating there altogether.
Although problems may result from the implementation of Mr. Fedders'
idea, nevertheless, we think it is an idea whose time has come. It should be
welcomed by the international community.
To explain our acceptance of the idea, let us look at our experience.
Between 1970 and 1982, the C.O.B. undertook three hundred investigations in
which major buyers were identified. In more than forty, orders coming from a
foreign country were considered questionable. So, the C.O.B. sees the problem
of investigating transnational securities transactions as a real one. To address
it, a three-pronged approach was adopted. First, the C.O.B. has asked foreign
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control authorities for their informal cooperation in these matters, offering
reciprocity in exchange. Second, it has set specific rules to govern activities
such as takeover bids. Finally, new provisions have been introduced into
French law enabling the C.O.B. to devise new forms of cooperation with its
foreign counterparts.
Applying the first part of this approach, the C.O.B. has asked for such help
from agencies like the Take-over Panel in London, and the Belgian Banking
Commission. The request was based on the recommendations of the Commission of the European Community dated July 15, 1977. These recommendations
provide that any person who, by his profession or function, gets price-sensitive
information, should refrain from engaging in any transaction before it becomes
public. In some cases the contacted agencies have contributed by providing
useful insights.
In cases where orders originated in Switzerland, the C.O.B. usually informed
the Bankers' Association there, while also directly notifying the Swiss banks
involved. This has led to a better understanding between the C.O.B. and the
banking institutions in Switzerland, a recent development which we regard as
very positive.
Attempts to gain Swiss cooperation formally through judiciary channels,
where the request is usually based on a mutual assistance treaty like the Hague
Convention, however, have failed to result in a waiver of bank secrecy. This is
due to the fact that insider trading is not a criminal offense in Switzerland.
The second part of the approach has resulted in the adoption of certain
regulations designed to deny market access to those intending to trade secretly.
The takeover bid regulation is a case in point. It requires the bidder, target,
their directors, 5% shareholders, and other persons acting "in concert" to make
a daily declaration of any purchase or sale of the offeree's shares. A similar
requirement applies to trading in offerors' shares if those involve an exchange
of securities. Since 1978, these requirements were extended to any person who
acquires at least 0.5% of the offeree's shares at the beginning of the bid. The
transactions are all published in the Official Bulletin of the Stock Exchange.
In order to prevent buyers from concealing their purchases by using a
foreign bank, French banks and brokers executing purchase orders during a
tender offer must be willing to disclose to the C.O.B., if asked, the identity of
the buyer. If the buyer is not acting for his own account, the bank or broker
must notify the buyer that this identity must be revealed, if it is requested by
the C.O.B. However, extending this special tender offer procedure to all orders
from foreign banks would, as noted by Mr. Fedders, drive securities business
off-shore and place undue burdens on brokers and dealers.
The last part of this approach involves suggesting to the government new
provisions that would allow specific exceptions to the blocking law of 1980,
and asserting the C.O.B.'s ability to cooperate with other supervisory bodies.
This was achieved through law no. 83-1 of January 3, 1983 (article 33). It
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allows the C.O.B. to share its information with other supervisory authorities,
whether in the EEC or outside, so long as they satisfy certain conditions
including reciprocity, co-extensive authority, and confidentiality.
These provisions imply a recognition of the investigative powers of administrative agencies and of the possibilities of exchanging information in ways
other than through judiciary channels. But they preserve the C.O.B.'s duty of
confidentiality; it exchanges information only with agencies that observe that
duty. Furthermore, the provisions could also supply an appropriate basis for
the C.O.B. to enter international mutual assistance agreements.
The "waiver by conduct" principle is certainly a promising and far-reaching
one, and the C.O.B. welcomes it. But this is only the easiest step in a long
process. An effective implementation of that principle requires going further
and organizing the enforcement instruments. This step is likely to be more
difficult. But if the condition of reciprocity is met, the C.O.B. would be willing
to participate with the other major interested countries in an international
effort, aimed at setting an agreement on the basis of this principle and the
organized enforcement instruments.
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